|
Operation ''Bagration'' (; (ロシア語:Oперация Багратио́н), Operatsiya ''Bagration'') was the codename for the Soviet 1944 Belorussian Strategic Offensive Operation〔Alternative spellings for ''Belorussian Offensive'' are ''Byelorussian Offensive'' and ''Belarusian Offensive''〕 ((ロシア語:Белорусская наступательная операция «Багратион»), Belorusskaya nastupatelnaya Operatsiya ''Bagration'') during World War II, which cleared German forces from the Belorussian SSR and eastern Poland between 22 June and 19 August 1944.〔Not to be confused with the 1943 Belorussian Strategic Offensive Operation (3 October–31 December 1943).〕 The operation was named after 18th–19th century Georgian Prince Pyotr Bagration, general of the Imperial Russian Army who was mortally wounded at the Battle of Borodino. The operation resulted in the almost complete destruction of an entire German army group, with the loss of Army Group Centre's Fourth Army, Third Panzer Army and Ninth Army. It is considered the most calamitous defeat experienced by the German armed forces during the Second World War. By the end of the operation most of the western Soviet Union had been liberated and the Red Army had achieved footholds in Romania and Poland. German losses eventually numbered well over half a million men killed or wounded, even higher than the toll at Verdun in 1916. The Soviet armies directly involved in Operation ''Bagration'' were the 1st Baltic Front under Army General Ivan Bagramyan, the 1st Belorussian Front commanded by Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky, the 2nd Belorussian Front commanded by Colonel-General G. F. Zakharov, and the 3rd Belorussian Front commanded by Colonel-General Ivan Chernyakhovsky. The Red Army practiced the concept of Soviet deep battle and maskirovka. Operation ''Bagration'' diverted German mobile reserves to the central sectors, removing them from the Lublin-Brest, Lvov–Sandomierz area, enabling the Soviets to undertake the Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive and Lublin–Brest Offensive. This allowed the Red Army to reach the Vistula river and Warsaw, which in turn put Soviet forces within striking distance of Berlin, conforming to the concept of Soviet deep operations — striking deep into the enemy's strategic depths. ==Background== Army Group Centre had previously proved tough to counter as the Soviet defeat in Operation ''Mars'' had shown. But by June 1944, despite shortening its front line, it had been exposed following the withdrawals of Army Group South in the battles that followed the Battle of Kursk, the Second Battle of Kiev and the Crimean Offensive in the late summer, autumn and winter of 1943–44. Operation ''Suvorov'' had seen Army Group Centre itself forced to retreat westwards from Smolensk during the autumn of 1943. By the middle of June 1944, the Western Allies on the Cotentin Peninsula were just over from Berlin, while the Soviet forces at the Vitebsk Gate were within of the German capital. For the Third Reich, the strategic threats were about the same. Hitler underestimated the threat posed by Soviet troops facing Army Group Centre, and had redeployed ⅓ of Army Group Centre's artillery, ½ their tank destroyers and 88% of their tanks to the Southern front where the German high command expected the next major Soviet offensive. Army Group Centre only had a total of 580 tanks, tank-destroyers and assault guns. They were opposed by over 9000 Soviet machines. The redeployment of forces from Army Group Center left only 80 men defending every kilometer of the front line.〔Holte, Geir. ''The Eastern Front, Operation Bagration 1944'' pp 10–11〕 ''Bagration'', in combination with the neighboring Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive launched a few weeks later in Ukraine, allowed the Soviet Union to recapture Belorussia and Ukraine within its 1941 borders, advance into German East Prussia, but more importantly, the Lvov-Sandomierz operation allowed the Red Army to reach the outskirts of Warsaw after gaining control of Poland east of the Vistula river. The operation enabled the next operation, the Vistula–Oder Offensive, to come within sight of the German capital. The Soviets were initially surprised at their success of the Belorussian operation which had nearly reached Warsaw. The Soviet advance encouraged the Warsaw uprising against the German occupation forces. The battle has been described as the triumph of the Soviet theory of "the operational art" because of the complete co-ordination of all the Strategic Front movements and signals traffic to fool the enemy about the target of the offensive. The military tactical operations of the Red Army successfully avoided the mobile reserves of the ''Wehrmacht'' and continually "wrong-footed" the German forces. Despite the huge forces involved, Soviet front commanders left their adversaries completely confused about the main axis of attack until it was too late. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Operation Bagration」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
|